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 The future power system will be an innovative administration of existing power grids, which is 
called smart grid. Above all, the application of advanced communication and computing tools is going to 
significantly improve the productivity and consistency of smart grid systems with renewable energy 
resources. Together with the topographies of the smart grid, cyber security appears as a serious concern 
since a huge number of automatic devices are linked through communication networks. Cyber attacks on 
those devices had a direct influence on the reliability of extensive infrastructure of the power system. In 
this survey, several published works related to smart grid system vulnerabilities, potential intentional 
attacks, and suggested countermeasures for these threats have been investigated. 
  




HE influence of cyber-attacks on the renovated structure of power system has been one 
of the burning issues in the recent years. As a result of its extremely integrated architecture, the 
smart grid (SG) is further exposed to virtual threats and attacks [1]. The SG is a power delivery 
infrastructure includes various energy measures, resources, and technologies such as smart 
meters, virtual power plants (VPPs), microgrids, renewable energy resources, and 
communication technologies [2-4]. It provides the two-way flow of power and information, 
controls, and optimizes the production and distribution of electricity through high voltage 
network from the power generator to energy storage systems and end user consumers [5-8]. 
The implementation of the SG requires utilization of multiple communication 
mechanisms, power electronic devices, electric vehicle charging stations, etc. which are 
considered as the heart of SGs. The multi voltage design is explained in the Energy efficient 
voltage conversion range of multiple level shifter design in multi voltage domain [9]. Because of 
extensive integrated topology of the SGs and their communication systems, they are weaker in 
the occurrence of cyber threats. In this survey, general vulnerabilities for the SG system have 
been introduced firstly (Section II). These weaknesses cause various cyber physical attacks on 
the SG. Common attacks and the cyber-physical impact of them are covered in Section III. 
Then, in Section IV some countermeasures and solutions for the attacks have been presented, 
and at the end, the paper is concluded in section V. Figure 1 shows a schematic structure for 
the SG system describing its major technologies. 
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Figure 1. A schematic structure for the SG system describing its major technologies 
 
 
There are three key security concepts that should be met in every cyber system: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In the SGs, confidentiality refers to putting authorized 
limi- tations on information in the personal privacy of consumers using the SG technologies and 
the SG normal operations. Integrity refers to protecting against incorrect information alteration 
and destruction, in order to prevent corruption of important data exchange, and guarantee the 
authenticity and validity of stored data. This data can be related to customers (e.g., account 
balance of customer and information on pricing) or network operations (e.g., running status of 
devices, voltage readings). Lastly, availability refers to ensuring that a reliable and timely access 
is provided for authorized users, and denying their access is not possible for an unauthorized 
user or system. The point of utilizing remote electronic frameworks is to enable information 
examination to be completed locally at field level and transmitting the outcomes remote to the 
base station, which therefore will beat the requirement for wiring and gives a simple and savvy 
detecting method to identify blames in machines [11]. 
 
 
2. Cyber System Vulnerabilities of Smart Grid 
Consumers’ Lack of Awareness: Comprehensive and strong security architecture for 
the SGs, including all important features required to analyze and detect the attacks, needs a 
huge investigation that might not be affordable for utilities alone. Therefore, the customers need 
to learn adequately about the risks, costs, and advantages of the SG systems, because of the 
demand for a higher level of security, and support the utilities, both for themselves and the 
society. The analysis of the fuzzy logic is explained in the design of a Single Input Fuzzy Logic 
Controller Based SVC for Dynamic Performance Enhancement of Power Systems [10]. 
Young and Unknown Technologies: many new technologies are adding to the SG which 
could be eye-catching to hackers and opponents for the reason that their point of weaknesses 
and security regulations has not been recognized would be simple. 
Scalability: is defined as a system ability to update its scale based on the growth in the 
size of demand. The SG technologies are considered as potential solutions for control- ling the 
complex electrical power systems, which are widely growing in population and technology. It is 
obvious that the growth in the quantity of circulating data and energy flows, the SG protocols, 
and the size of network structure directly affect the size and complexity of the SGs. This volume 
of information and complexity might cause data accumulation, and control efficiency destruction, 
if not handled and accom-modated properly in the SG. Therefore, efficient data flow 
construction solutions are required to prevent these problems in the system. 
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The Weaknesses Received from Joined Communication Technologies: applying 
existing ICTs in the structure of the SGs can lead to inheriting almost all the susceptibilities and 
unresolved problems (e.g., routing problems, IP spoofing, Denial of Service attacks, etc.) from 
these technologies to the SG system. Lack of Standards and Regulations: interoperability of a 
SG refers to the ability of various systems to work co operatively, interchange equipment or data 
from each other, and use the harmonious parts to perform a task. To achieve interoperability, 
standards and regulations must include each part of the SG. It is also worthy to mention that 
novel protocols publishing continuously, sometimes cause security missing in the SGd (e.g., 
Distributed Network Protocol). 
 
 
3. Cyber-Physical Attacks in Smart Grid 
Man-in-the-Middle Attack: the Man-in-the-Middle (MIT-M) attack is a type of 
eavesdropping, wherein the adversary tries to make separated connections with a risky 
communication at both endpoints and transmits information in between. Moreover, the 
authorized users at the endpoints think they are talking directly to each other using their 
personal connection. Some utilities still apply normal User Datagram Protocol (UDP), in order to 
transmit the data measured by Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU), without other cyber 
protections, such as SSL. This can increase the chance of exploitation for MITM attacks. In 
addition, for the network from substation to control center, which called Wide Area Network 
(WAN), some of the utility companies use the public communication line, which is vulnerable to 
network attacks, and some other utility companies use private communication line, in which the 
attacker can use the hardware access to enter. The MITM attacks are generally applied to 
corrupt information including control commands, values of measurements, pricing signals, etc., 
in the transferred packets, and also exploit important parts of the system for coming attacks, by 
accessing the observations of control center operators. 
Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS): in the WAN, there are some vulnerability to 
access PMU communication network. The malwares can be installed on the router located at 
the substation, or communication network can be accessed by guessing the default password 
considered for the devices. 
A DoS attack tries to make an important resource inaccessible to its authorized users in 
a suitable volume when needed. In the power system, all communication channels must be 
available as much as possible, specifically when the power system is closing to an instability 
point where an important control action required. If the DoS attack is successful in such a 
situation, the reliability needed for the modern power grids will be at risk. 
The DDoS attack is a type of DoS attack, which is used by infected (often by Trojan 
program) multiple risky systems to target a single system. It is a potential cyber threat in 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which often includes two phases: (1) agents 
recruitment phase, and (2) actual attack phase. 
a. Agents Recruitment Phase: to initiate a DDoS in AMI network, an attacker first needs to 
recognize the weak meters which are considered as the agents. A large number of 
homogeneous devices in AMI network make it possible that a security error in a single meter 
exists in many other meters. Then the attacker communicates with many IP-based smart meters 
that have already been infected with malicious code. Instead of entering a large number of 
agents, the attacker can implant the malicious program or change the firmware in the middle of 
the communication session by exploiting hardware and software weaknesses. A suitable 
propagation model to distribute attack malware should be chosen. The attacker can put the 
malicious program in a file source, and each agent copies the code from it(repository model), 
can make the risky agent download the malware from the attacking host(Back-chaining Model), 
or can infect and exploit the agents without agents necessity to download the malware from an 
allocated source(The Autonomous model). IP spoofing can be applied to hide the infected 
agents, which makes the process of finding the source of attack among a huge number of 
meters harder. 
b. Actual Attack Phase: three categories of possible attack mechanism to launch a DDOS 
attack on AMI infrastructure are: 
• Attacks on protocol: the attacker could exploit the vulnerabilities of the protocol to consume 
user’s resources. For instance, a TCP SYN flooding attack can be used to deactivate the 
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service on data collecting unit or head-end of AMI environment which is using 
Transportation Control Protocol (TCP). 
• Attacks on infrastructure: The attacker may deliberately interrupt the routing tables to 
worsen the action efficiency of packet distribution in AMI packet- exchange network. 
• Attacks on bandwidth: many agents can be manipulated to send an exceeding volume of 
communication packets to the system user. Therefore, the flooding traffic will make the 
authorized user drop some of the legitimate packets (the drop ratio can be considerable). 
False data injection attack as a well crafted type of integrity attack, false data injection 
attack is able to have an impact on the operation and control of SGs by passing the bad data 
detection systems through state estimation, and the compromised sensors are made to mimic 
the events that do not occur actually. The attacker could inject the malicious data to a randomly 
chosen vector, or a specific meter to disturb the state variables. The latter is more serious attack 
since the attacker knows adequately about the network topology, and cause preset changes in 
the state variables. The detection of malicious data attacks is more complicated if critical meters 
have been compromised. Some conventional techniques, which protect specific critical sensors 
in the power system, can relieve the false data injection attacks. 
These attacks can have various types regarding the type of the attacked meters (e.g. in 
load alteration attacks and load relocation attacks, load meter quantity is altered to initiate a 
cyber attack on the SG. 
 
 
4.    Countermeasures and Protective Actions against Cyber Attacks  
4.1. IP Fast Hopping Mechanism 
Many methods are introduced based on the point of time the guarding against DDoS 
attacks occurs. Two categories are defined for these approaches: a) Attack prevention methods, 
which include refining protocol and overall system security level, resource allotment & 
accounting, firewalls, etc., and 
 
4.2. Attack Detection Methods, Which Include Attack Source Recognition and 
Appropriate Reaction  
As an instance of the prevention mechanisms, IP Fast Hopping is proposed which to 
refine even huge malicious streams. It is a new method that can be applied to hide details and 
endpoints of user’s communication period to counteract exhausting of servers resources 
initiated by DDoS attacks. It covers the actual IP address of the server between large numbers 
of imaginary IP addresses. The transferring of the real IP address on one of the imaginary 
addresses is unique for each communication period, and the imaginary IP address is changing 
in realtime based on a specific schedule. Only the legitimate user is able to have access to the 
information of schedule changing to send a request to a real IP address, limiting the ability of an 
attacker to produce high load on the server. This approach is distributed as it distributes the 
authorized user’s traffic in some sub-streams and causes load reduction on network system 
during attack. 
 
4.3. Encryption Mechanisms 
Many standard encryption algorithms and authentication structures are employed to 
improve the confidentiality and integrity (which are two of main security concepts) of the data 
and protect against potential threats in the SG. It was declared in previous studies, the device 
cost and power consumption should be taken into account in cryptography design. 
There are several categories of encryption mechanisms. One of them is Symmetric 
encryption algorithms, which include some well-known models such as DES (Data Encryption 
Standard), Triple DES, and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). For instance, ZigBee uses 
128-bit AES encryption. Another category is asymmetric encryption algorithms, and as it said in 
previous works Asymmetric encryption algorithms are generally more costly than Symmetric 
ones in computational-based point of view. 
Symmetric code effectively manages the huge volume of data, while usually has a 
shorter lifetime in compare with the asymmetric cipher. Changing the symmetric cipher with a 
specific manner is recommended and becomes an important issue in SG, in which there are a 
huge number of widely distributed objects.The encryption key management is a controversial 
and essential concern in applying cryptographic algorithms for the SG. Public key infrastructure 
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(PKI) is the base for a most efficient key management system in the SG. All of the suggested 
methods employ an external team or system for authentication recognition or key generation, 
which can lead to extra cost for tools and increase in communication traffic. Some novel 
methods which are recently proposed a focus on the privacy aspect of smart metering data, 
protecting home area network (HAN), improving the efficiency and security of advanced 
metering infrastructure (AMI), and securing the information aggregation in SG. 
 
4.4. IDS-based Technologies 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys- tems in the application of the 
SG will unavoidably contain legacy systems that cannot be updated, protected, or repaired by 
conventional Information Technology security methods, due to the lack of built-in security for 
SCADA systems, and inadequate computation resources for legacy devices. Hence, Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) technologies in the IT domain are required to control the operation of 
such systems and to detect threats, coming from mistakes of authorized users or deliberate 
attacks. Many intrusion detection approaches addressed the SCADA systems, have been 
proposed, such as Statistics- based intrusion detection methods, and SCADA- specific intrusion 
detection approaches, which has recently started to develop. 
IDSs use statistical methods to categorize network traffic as usual or unusual in SCADA 
systems. In order to build the statistical models, various modeling methods like regression 
models, neural networks, and Bayesian networks can be applied. Nevertheless, most statistical 
intrusion methods produce false positives resulting in false alerts, and false negatives resulting 
in problems for identifying actual attacks. 
Typical IDS consist of agents, management or database servers, and user interface. 
There are three categories for the IDS methods: centralized, embedded and dedicated. The IDS 
can infer potential detrimental or suspicious activities by checking corresponding physical or 
cyber events, e.g., doubtful power failure notifications from a certain client, unusual log 
information, unusual traffic for communication, and several lacks of communication cases. 
Three possible detection mech- anisms are stateful specification-based monitoring, a stateless 
specification based monitoring, and anomaly-based monitor- ing. In addition to detection 
mechanism, the whole system security level must be maintained by the protector, doing 
activities such as deleting software bugs, updating firmware and protocols, repair software 
timely, etc SCADA-specific IDSs employ critical state, model, and rule-based approaches for 
SCADA systems. However, there is not enough information regarding the variety of SCADA 
protocols and applications. Several types of research have been presented in this regard such 
as critical state-based IDS for SCADA on the basis of Modbus protocol in a power station, 
model-based controlling methods to discover unknown attacks in SCADA systems, a rule-based 




Cyber security in the SG is a fresh research topic that has been the center of attention 
in the industry section, government, and universities. In this study, vulnerabilities of the SG, 
different kinds of attacks in the system and some countermeasures to increase the security of 
the future power systems have been discussed.As it is reviewed, cyber security is still 
progressing in the SG, and because of structures of the SG communication network, it is almost 
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